Railway safety critical systems with task redundancy and asymmetric communications capability

ABSTRACT

A railway safety critical application system substitutes commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware and/or software for railway-domain specific product components, yet is validated to conform to railway safety critical system failure-free standards. The safety critical system uses a pair of tasks executed on a controller of a COTS personal computer or within a virtual environment with asymmetric communications capability. Both tasks receive and verify safety critical systems input message data and security code integrity and separately generate output data responsive to the input message. The first task has sole capability to send complete safety critical system output messages, but only the second task has the capability of generating the output security code. A failure of any of systems hardware, software or processing capability results failure to transmit a safety critical system output message or an output message that cannot be verified by other safety critical systems.

BACKGROUND OF THE DISCLOSURE

1. Field of the Invention

The invention relates to railway control safety critical systems. Moreparticularly, the present invention relates to control systems inrailway safety critical application systems with low hazard rates, as isneeded in the railway industry. Railway safety critical applicationsystems (“safety critical systems”) include by way of non-limitingexample train management systems, back office server, onboard units forautomatic intervention if a train exceeds safeguarded speed limits, datarecorders that record operational information, train speed and positiondetermination equipment, brake and throttle control, sub-system statusand diagnostics, wireless data communications exchanged betweentrackside/landside and train side (e.g., via wireless radiocommunications) and train crew communications. As used herein, the term“train” is a locomotive alone, locomotive with cars, or an integratedlocomotive/car vehicle, (e.g., light rail or subway).

2. Description of the Prior Art

Railway trains are equipped with safety critical systems that arerequired to have high availability and low hazard rates (a “hazard” iscommonly understood as “physical situation with a potential for humaninjury and/or damage to environment” (IEC 62278)). “Railway operatorsand governmental regulators often require exceedingly low hazard ratesthat satisfy their high demand for operational safety.”). Safetycritical systems are typically operated with electronic control systems.Over time those systems are gravitating to processor or controlleroperated digital electronic systems that communicate with each otherover one or more communications data buses.

In order to meet railway safety objectives, control system hardware isoften of proprietary dedicated design with documented testing andvalidation. Digital electronic controller operating systems andapplication software are also validated. Electronic data communicationsutilize validated security codes for data integrity checks, such as hashcodes or cryptographic attachments, in order to assure data integrityupon transmission between the systems. Validation processes require timeand expense. Given the relatively limited demand and sales volume ofrailway safety critical systems, as compared to demand for generalcommercial and consumer electronics (e.g., personal computer hardware,software and operating systems), the railway safety critical systemscontrollers and related equipment are expensive to manufacture and havelonger product lifecycles than those sold in the general electronicsapplications fields.

However, consumer and commercial personal computers (PC's) cannot bedirectly substituted for existing railway safety critical systemscontrol systems. PC's are often only having a data failure rate of nomore than 10⁻⁴ per operational hour, which is insufficient to meetrailway systems required hazard. Additionally, PC commercial operatingsystem software is not validated for use in railway safety criticalsystems.

There is a need in the railway industry to replace railway-domainspecific proprietary design safety critical system control systemhardware and operating system software with more readily availablegeneral purpose commercial off the shelf (“COTS”) products, wherefeasible. Substitution of COTS subsystems for railway-domain specificproprietary design subsystems potentially can simplify overall systemdesign, shorten system design cycles, and allow the railway safetycritical system prime supplier to focus its efforts on overall systemapplication and integration issues, where it has greater expertise thangeneral consumer or COTS electronics sub-vendors.

There is also a need in the railway industry to reduce safety criticalsystem control system procurement costs and increase the number ofqualified sub-vendors by substituting COTS products for railway-domainspecific products, when validation of the substitutes is cost effective.The railway customer and safety critical system prime supplier may alsobenefit from outsourcing design and manufacture of subsystem componentsto sub-vendors whom may have broader design expertise for theirrespective commercial components.

There is an additional need in the railway industry to streamline safetycritical system procurement timelines by simplifying and aggregatingvalidation procedures. For example, if commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)control system hardware and software components already meet recognizedand documented reliability validation standards; there may be no need torevalidate those same products for railway critical system applications.Rather, the safety critical system validation may be consolidated andsimplified by a general system validation process that includescontributions of already validated commercial off-the-shelf products,thereby streamlining procurement timelines and processes.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

Accordingly, an object of the present invention is to simplify railwaysafety critical systems overall design by replacing proprietary designsafety critical system control system hardware and operating systemsoftware with more readily available non-proprietary commercialproducts.

It is also an object of the present invention to reduce safety criticalsystem control system procurement costs and increase the number ofqualified sub-vendors whom may have broader design expertise in theirrespective commercial product lines by substituting non-proprietaryproducts for proprietary products when validation for the substitutes iscost effective.

An additional object of the present invention is to streamline safetycritical system control system procurement costs and validationtimelines, as well as increase the number of qualified vendors bysimplifying and aggregating validation procedures.

These and other objects are achieved in accordance with the presentinvention by a control system for a railway safety critical applicationsystem (“safety critical system”) and method for operating that controlsystem that substitutes commercial off-the-shelf hardware and operatingsystem software for railway-domain specific proprietary productcomponents, yet can be validated as in conformance with railway safetycritical system standards. For example, a commercial personal computeror a virtual computer environment with one or more personal computersand operating systems may be substituted for proprietary railway-domainspecific railway environment with two independent tasks, threads ornodes, and are configured for asymmetrical communication with othersafety critical systems. Both tasks receive and verify safety criticalsystems input message data and security code integrity and separatelygenerate output data responsive to the input message. With anasymmetrical communication architecture, the first task has solecapability to send safety critical system output messages including theoutput data but without output security code, and only the second taskhas the capability of generating the needed output security code. Due toredundancy and asymmetrical communications architecture, a failure ofeither or both tasks, software or processing capability results infailure to transmit a safety critical system output message or an outputmessage that cannot be verified (and thus not used or trusted) by othersafety critical systems that receive those unverified messages.

The present invention features a control system for a railway safetycritical application system (“safety critical system”). The controlsystem has at least one controller executing first and second tasks. Thefirst task has an external bilateral communications interface capable ofsending and receiving a safety critical systems message that isgenerated within a railway safety critical application system. Thatmessage includes a security code and safety critical data. The secondtask has an external communications interface capable of receiving butincapable of sending a safety critical systems message that is generatedwithin the second task. The second task has a security code generator.The control system has an inter-task communications pathway coupling thefirst and second task. When operating the control system of the presentinvention the first and second tasks respectively receive an inputsafety critical systems message including input safety critical systemsdata and an input security code. They both verify the input messageintegrity and generate output safety critical systems data. The secondtask generates an output security code and sends it to the first task.Then the first task sends an output safety critical systems messageincluding the output safety critical systems data and the second task'soutput security code for use within the safety critical applicationsystem.

The present invention also features a railway system comprising aplurality of control systems for controlling railway safety criticalsystems. The control systems are communicatively coupled to each otherfor receipt and transmission of safety critical systems messagesrespectively having safety critical data and a security code. At leastsome of the respective control systems each have at least one controllerexecuting first and second tasks. The first task has an externalbilateral communications interface capable of sending and receiving asafety critical systems message that is generated within anotherconnected system. The second task has an external communicationsinterface capable of receiving but incapable of sending a safetycritical systems message that is generated within this second task. Thesecond task has a security code generator. An inter-task communicationspathway couples the first and second tasks. In operation of thoserespective control systems the first and second tasks respectivelyreceive an input safety critical systems message including input safetycritical systems data and an input security code; verify the inputmessage integrity and generate output safety critical systems data. Thesecond task generates an output security code and sends it to the firsttask, and the first task sends an output safety critical systems messageincluding the output safety critical systems data and the second task'soutput security code, for use within the connected system.

The present invention additionally features a method for controllingsafety critical railway control systems (such as interlocking systems ortrain control systems). The method comprises receiving with respectivefirst and second tasks that are executed on at least one controller asafety critical systems input message that is generated within a railwaytrain that includes a security code and safety critical data, andindependently verifying the input message integrity. Next each of thetasks independently generates output safety critical systems data inresponse to the input message. The second task generates an outputsecurity code that is sent to the first task, which is in turn thenresponsible for assembling, verifying and sending an output safetycritical systems message including the output safety critical systemsdata and the second task's output security code.

The objects and features of the present invention may be applied jointlyor severally in any combination or sub-combination by those skilled inthe art.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The teachings of the present invention can be readily understood byconsidering the following detailed description in conjunction with theaccompanying drawings, in which:

FIG. 1 is an onboard train control system general schematic drawingshowing interaction of train safety critical systems of the presentinvention;

FIG. 2 is a schematic of a computer or controller of the type used intrain safety critical system control systems of the present invention;

FIG. 3 is an exemplary safety critical systems message format used inthe safety critical system control systems of the present invention;

FIG. 4 is a block diagram showing communications interaction among thesafety critical system control systems of the present invention;

FIG. 5 is a timing diagram showing processing steps performed by anexemplary embodiment of the safety critical system control systems ofthe present invention; and

FIG. 6 is a timing diagram showing processing steps performed by anotherexemplary embodiment of the safety critical system control systems ofthe present invention.

To facilitate understanding, identical reference numerals have beenused, where possible, to designate identical elements that are common tothe figures.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

After considering the following description, those skilled in the artwill clearly realize that the teachings of the present invention can bereadily utilized in a railway safety critical system that substitutescommercial hardware and/or operating system software for proprietaryproduct components, yet is validated to conform with railway safetycritical system standards. In some embodiments of the present inventionthe safety critical system utilizes a virtual computer environment withone or more personal computers, with two independent tasks and operatingsystems, or other commercially available controllers and operatingsystems. Each computer, operating system, software language and compilermay differ for additional diversity. Both tasks receive and verifysafety critical systems input message data and security code integrityand separately generate output data responsive to the input message. Theseparate paired tasks communicate asymmetrically. The first task hassole capability to send safety critical system output messages,including the output data and an output security code, but only thesecond task has the capability of generating the output security code. Afailure of either computer hardware, software or processing capabilityresults failure to transmit a safety critical system output message ortransmits an output message that cannot be verified (and thus not usedor trusted) by other safety critical systems that receive thoseunverified messages.

General Description of Train Safety Critical Systems

FIG. 1 shows generally a railway system with fixed tracks 10 and one ormore trains 40. The general description herein concerning traincommunications, interactions of train systems including safety criticalsystems or the like, is of a general nature to assist in understandinghow the present invention may be utilized in a railway train. Individualtrain networks and train systems may vary from the general exemplarydescription set forth herein. The train 40 includes a wirelessdata/communications system 42 that is capable of transmitting andreceiving wireless data, which is in communication with thecommunications system wireless track-train-control station network (notshown).

The train transmitter and receiver communications safety critical system42 is communicatively coupled directly or indirectly to other safetycritical systems, including the onboard train management system (TMS) 50and an onboard unit (OBU) 51 that intervenes in train speed control andbraking in the event that the train operator fails to follow local trackspeed and stopping mandates. Typically the train 40 also has an onboarddata recording system (DRS) 60 of known design, with a recorder 62 andone or more associated memory storage devices 64, for among other thingsacquiring, processing, organizing, formatting and recording incidentdata. As with any other safety critical system, the DRS 60 function maybe incorporated as a subsystem within another train onboard vitalsystem, such as the train management system (TMS) 50, rather than as aseparate stand-alone device.

As also shown in FIG. 1, train 40 generally has other safety criticalsubsystems, including drive system 72 that provides driving force to oneor more wheel carriages, and brake system 74 for altering train speed.The on-board train management system (TMS) 50 is the principalelectronic control device for all other controlled train subsystems,including the navigation position system (NPS) 82A with associated trainlocation detection system 82B that provides train position and speedinformation. Other subsystems include throttle control that causes thedrive system 72 (e.g., more or less throttled speed) and receivescommands from the TMS 50. The brake system 74 causes the brakes to brakethe train 40. The brake system 74 also receives commands from the TMS50. Other train cars and/or tandem locomotives 40′ optionally may be incommunication with the TMS 50 or other subsystems in train 40, such asfor coordination of braking and throttle control. The train 40 also hasa train crew human-machine interface (HMI) 90 that has an electronicdisplay screen 91 and operator actuated brake B and throttle T controls(one or both of which are used by the operator depending upon the trainoperating conditions), so that the train operator can drive the train.The HMI 90 communicates with the TMS 50 via communications data bus 92,though other known communications pathways can be substituted for thedata bus when implementing other known control system architectures. TheHMI 90 communicates train operator respective throttle T and brake Bcontrol commands to the respective engine control 72 and the brakesystem 74.

In this exemplary embodiment of FIG. 1, each of the TMS train controlsystem 50, the OBU 51, the data recording system (DRS) 60 and the HMI 90have internal computer/controller platforms 100 of known design thatcommunicates with each other via data bus 92. However the number ofcomputer controllers, their location and their distributed functions maybe altered as a matter of design choice. In this exemplary embodiment,general control of train 40 subsystems is performed by TMS 50 and thecontroller platform 100 therein; the intervention functions areperformed by the OBU 51 and the controller platform 100 therein; thedata recording functions are performed by the data recording system 60and the controller platform 100 therein; and the HMI functions areperformed by HMI 90 and the controller platform 100 therein, though anyof these systems 50, 51, 60, 90 may be combined in part or in whole.

General Description of Safety Critical Railway Systems Tasks and theirCommunication

Referring to FIG. 2, a physical or virtual controller platform 100includes a processor 110 and a controller bus 120 in communicationtherewith. Processor 110 is coupled to one or more internal or externalmemory devices 130 that include therein operating system 140 andapplication program 150 software module instruction sets that areaccessed and executed by the processor, and cause its respective controldevice (e.g., TMS 50, OBU 51, DRS 60 or HMI 90, etc.) to perform controloperations over their respective associated safety critical subsystems.

While reference to an exemplary controller platform 100 architecture andimplementation by software modules executed by the processor 110, it isalso to be understood that the present invention may be implemented invarious forms of hardware, software, firmware, special purposeprocessors, or a combination thereof. Preferably, aspects of the presentinvention are implemented in software as a program tangibly embodied ona program storage device. The program may be uploaded to, and executedby, a machine comprising any suitable architecture. Preferably, themachine is implemented on a computer platform having hardware such asone or more central processing units (CPU), a random access memory(RAM), and input/output (I/O) interface(s). The computer platform 100also includes an operating system and microinstruction code. The variousprocesses and functions described herein may be either part of themicroinstruction code or part of the program (or combination thereof)which is executed via the operating system. In addition, various otherperipheral devices may be connected to the computer/controller platform100.

It is to be understood that, because some of the constituent systemcomponents and method steps depicted in the accompanying figures arepreferably implemented in software, the actual connections between thesystem components (or the process steps) may differ depending upon themanner in which the present invention is programmed. Specifically, anyof the computer platforms or devices may be interconnected using anyexisting or later-discovered networking technology and may also all beconnected through a larger network system, such as a corporate network,metropolitan network or a global network, such as the Internet.

Computer/controller platform 100 receives input communications from oneor more input devices I via respective communications pathways I′through input interface 160, that in turn can distribute the inputinformation via the controller bus 120. Output interface 180 facilitatescommunication with one or more output devices O via associatedcommunications pathways O′. The controller platform 100 also has acommunications interface 170 for communication with other controllers ona shared external data bus, such as the data bus 92 that was previouslydescribed.

Referring go FIGS. 2-4, communications among computer/controllerplatforms 100 and their respective safety critical systems (SCS1-SCSn)are accomplished via a safety critical systems message (SCSM) 200carried on data bus 92. Each SCSM 200 is formatted and transmitted inaccordance with a known protocol that is approved for safety criticaldata integrity in railway critical systems, including a known securitycode generated by known CHECK-SUM, HASH, etc. protocols. The exemplarySCSM 200 shown in FIG. 3 includes a time stamp 210, and if required asequence number and source and destination identifiers (not shown),safety critical system data (SCS data) 220 and a security code (SC) 230.For ease of description herein, an incoming or input safety criticalsystems message (SCSMI) comprises safety critical input data (DI) and aninput security code (SI). Similarly, an outgoing or output safetycritical systems message (SCSMO) comprises safety critical output data(DO) and an output security code (SO). When a safety critical systemSCS1-SCSn receives a SCSMI its data integrity is verified with a knownSCI 240 analysis module within the tasks (T1, T2) that is implemented inhardware, firmware, software or any combination thereof. If the SCSMIdata integrity is verified the DI are utilized by the tasks to prepare aresponsive output message SCSMO including output data DO and an outputsecurity code generated in SCO 250 generation module. As with the SCI240 module the SCO 250 module generation function is implemented inhardware, firmware, software or any combination thereof. Thesubsequently generated SCSMO is communicated to one or more intendedrecipient SCS controller platforms that in turn treat the message as aSCSMI.

Redundant Control System and Operation

In FIG. 4 the safety critical system tasks SCS1 and SCS2 respectivelycomprise a paired set of tasks T1 300 and T2 320 that are in bilateralcommunication with each other via inter-controller data interface 330.The tasks 300, 320 are running in commercially available industrial,commercial or consumer devices, such as for example industrialprogrammable logic controllers, separate or unitized computer/controllermotherboards, or commercial off-the-shelf personalcomputers/motherboards. By way of further example if the tasks 300, 320are executed literally or virtually in personal computers, they may beexecuted on the same or separate controllers 100, in one or morecomputers that housed in separate devices, combined in a common devicehousing, separate boards in a server rack, etc. Each of the one or morecomputers may comprise different hardware including separate or commoncontroller platforms 100, and/or processors 110 and/or operating systems140 and/or application programs 150 stored therein that are executed bythe processor(s) to perform the its respective dedicated safety criticalsystem function. The components and software used in each respectivetask 300, 320 may be sourced from different vendors. For example, eachtask 300, 320 may utilize different vendor models, versions or types ofprocessors 110, operating systems 140 and application software 150, soas to reduce potential of a generalized vendor-wide component orsoftware failure. In another exemplary embodiment or configurationimplementation of the separate tasks T1 and T2, both are executedsimultaneously and virtually in real time, in a common computerprocessor 100, with the respective SCI 240 and SCO 250 sub-tasks alsoimplemented virtually.

The T1 task 300 is capable of bilateral communication with the criticalsystem data bus 92 through communications pathway 340, which maycomprise a communications port enabled in the task platform 100communications interface 170. Task 300 has an incoming security codeverification module 240 that enables it to verify data integrity of aSCSMI, but it does not have the capability of generating an outgoingSCSMO security code SCO.

The T2 task 320 has an enabled outgoing security code SCO generator 250,but is incapable of transmitting an SCO and critical output datadirectly to the critical system data interface 92. Task 320 is only ableto transmit the SCO to task 300 via the internal data interface 330: itis only capable of receiving a SCSMI through unilateral, incomingcommunications pathway 350 and can verify data integrity with SCIverification module 240. In other words, the T2 task 320 is incapable oftransmitting directly SCSMO to the data bus 92.

As can be understood by reference to FIGS. 5 and 6, the respective T1task 300 and T2 Task 320 in SCS1 are in a mutually dependent, pairedrelationship with asymmetric communications implementations. The firstT1 task 300 is capable of receiving a SCSMI and sending a responsiveSCSMO, but it cannot create the responsive message until it receives theSCO from the second T2 task 320. The T2 task is not capable of externalcommunication to the critical system data bus 92, and must rely on theT1 task to send any messages.

In FIG. 5, one of the safety critical systems SCS2-SCSn is sending aSCSMI in step 400, comprising a DI and an SCI to SCS1 at time t₁, whereit is received by both T1 and T2. At t₂, both T1 and T2 verify the SCSMIdata integrity in step 410 and in step 420 both generate DO data (t₃) inresponse to the input data DI. In step 430 T2 generates the outputsecurity code SCO at time t₄ and sends it to T1 in step 440. In step 450(t₅), T1 now assembles and optionally verifies the DO (provided by T2 inthe prior step) with its own generated DO before transmitting the SCSMOthrough critical systems data bus 92 in step 460 (t₆) to other safetycritical systems. If the DO do not corroborate each other during step450 (i.e., output data is suspect) it will not transmit the SCSMO.Alternatively, if T1 is not enabled to verify the DO or if T1 and/or T2are malfunctioning, it may transmit a corrupted SCSMO, but thecorruption will be identified when the message is received by anothersafety critical system.

The embodiment of FIG. 6 has all of the steps and processes as theembodiment of FIG. 5, but adds a compare SCSMI verification step 415,where T1 and T2 check each other's respective verification results. Ifthe compared results are not the same SCS1 flags a fault. Thisembodiment also adds a compare output data DO step 425 before T2generates the security output code SCO in step 430. Again, if thecompared results are not the same SCS1 flags a fault.

The software redundancy and mutually dependent asymmetric communicationoutput security code generation/transmission features of the presentinvention railway control system for safety critical systems assures ahigher safety level than any individual or independently parallelprocessing pair of commercial off-the-shelf controllers or personalcomputers. A single computer is susceptible to multiple forms of failurethat would not necessarily be detected by other safety critical systemsreceiving SCSMOs from the failing computer. Two independent, paralleltask executions T1 and T2, whether implemented on one or multiplecomputer platforms, feeding identical SCSMOs to other safety criticalsystems or that corroborate output messages prior to transmission canboth be generating identical incorrect output messages. Such failuremode transmission errors are not possible with the control system of thepresent invention.

When analyzing possible failure modes of the safety critical systemscontrol system of the present invention SCS1, if T1 calculates anincorrect DO and T2 calculates a correct DO and SCO, then duringverification step 450 T1 will flag a mismatch between its own DO and theDO and flag an error. If T1 does not verify the SCSMO in step 450 othersafety critical systems receiving that message will flag the error whenthey verify the received message. Conversely if the T1 DO is correct buteither the T2 DO or SCO are incorrect, T2 or other SCS receiving theSCSMO will identify the error. If both T1 and T2 malfunction andgenerate faulty DO and/or SCO the mismatch of the DO and SCO will benoted by other critical systems that subsequently receive the corruptedmessage.

Although various embodiments, which incorporate the teachings of thepresent invention, have been shown and described in detail herein, thoseskilled in the art can readily devise many other varied embodiments thatstill incorporate these teachings.

What is claimed is:
 1. A control system for a railway safety criticalapplication system, comprising: at least one controller executing firstand second tasks; the first task having an external bilateralcommunications interface capable of sending and receiving a safetycritical systems message within a railway safety critical applicationsystem, the message including a security code and safety critical data;the second task having an external communications interface capable ofreceiving a safety critical systems message, but incapable of sending asafety critical systems message that is generated within the secondtask, the second task having a security code generator; and aninter-task communications pathway coupling the first and second tasks;wherein the first and second tasks respectively receive an input safetycritical systems message including input safety critical systems dataand an input security code, verify the input message integrity andgenerate output safety critical systems data, the second task generatesan output security code and sends it to the first task, and the firsttask sends an output safety critical systems message including theoutput safety critical systems data and the second task output securitycode for use within the railway safety critical application system. 2.The system of claim 1, wherein the first and second tasks compare theirrespective input message integrity verifications prior to generatingrespective output safety critical systems data.
 3. The system of claim2, wherein the first and second tasks compare their respective outputsafety critical systems data.
 4. The system of claim 3, wherein thefirst and second tasks compare their respective output safety criticalsystems data prior to generation of the output security code.
 5. Thesystem of claim 1, wherein the first task verifies output safetycritical systems data integrity before sending the output safetycritical systems message.
 6. The system of claim 1, wherein the firstand second tasks are executed on at least one personal computer, thetasks further executed by at least one of different operating systems orsoftware instruction sets.
 7. The system of claim 1 wherein thefunctions of at least one of the tasks is executed virtually.
 8. Arailway safety critical application system comprising the control systemof claim
 1. 9. A railway safety critical application system comprisingthe control system of claim
 6. 10. A railway system comprising: aplurality of control systems for controlling railway safety criticalsystems, the control systems communicatively coupled to each other forreceipt and transmission of safety critical systems messagesrespectively having safety critical data and a security code, therespective control systems comprising: at least one controller executingfirst and second tasks; the first task having an external bilateralcommunications interface capable of sending and receiving a safetycritical systems message that is generated within the railway system;the second task having an external communications interface capable ofreceiving a safety critical systems message, but incapable of sending asafety critical systems message that is generated within the secondtask, the second task having a security code generator; and aninter-task communications pathway coupling the first and second tasks;wherein the first and second tasks respectively receive an input safetycritical systems message including input safety critical systems dataand an input security code, verify the input message integrity andgenerate output safety critical systems data, the second task generatesan output security code and sends it to the first task, and the firsttask sends an output safety critical systems message including theoutput safety critical systems data and the second task output securitycode, for use within the railway system.
 11. The railway system of claim10, wherein the first and second tasks compare their respective inputmessage integrity verifications prior to generating respective outputsafety critical systems data.
 12. The railway system of claim 11,wherein the first and second tasks compare their respective outputsafety critical systems data.
 13. The railway system of claim 12,wherein the first and second tasks compare their respective outputsafety critical systems data prior to generation of the output securitycode.
 14. The railway system of claim 10, wherein the first taskverifies output safety critical systems data integrity before sendingthe output safety critical systems message.
 15. The railway system ofclaim 10, wherein within each respective control system the first andsecond tasks are executed on at least one personal computer, the tasksfurther executed by at least one of different operating systems orsoftware instruction sets.
 16. The railway train of claim 15, whereineach respective control system the first and second tasks are executedon computers have different hardware construction and differentoperating systems.
 17. A method for controlling a railway safetycritical application control system, comprising: receiving withrespective first and second tasks that are executed on at least onecontroller a safety critical systems input message that is generatedwithin a railway safety critical application system that includes asecurity code and safety critical data, and independently verifying theinput message integrity; independently generating output safety criticalsystems data in response to the input message with the respective firstand second tasks; generating an output security code only with thesecond task and sending the generated output security code to the firsttask; and assembling and sending an output safety critical systemsmessage including the output safety critical systems data and secondtask output security code with the first task.
 18. The method of claim17, further comprising comparing first and second tasks respective inputmessage integrity verifications prior to generating respective outputsafety critical systems data.
 19. The method of claim 18, furthercomprising comparing first and second tasks respective output safetycritical systems data.
 20. The method of claim 19, further comprisingcomparing first and second tasks respective output safety criticalsystems data prior to generating the output security code.